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PLAINTIFF S99/2016 AND THE EXPANSION OF  
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
 
BRUCE CHEN∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In Plaintiff S99/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Plaintiff S99),1 
the Federal Court found that the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (the 
Minister) owed a duty of care to a refugee under the law of negligence.  In this highly 
publicised dispute,2 the plaintiff had arrived by boat in Australia and was detained in 
Nauru.  Following her release into the Nauruan community and whilst awaiting 
resettlement, she was raped and became pregnant.  The Court granted the plaintiff an 
injunction, precluding the Minister from procuring an abortion for her in Papua New 
Guinea, due to risks to her safety and the lawfulness of abortion there.   
 
The Federal Court granted the plaintiff injunctive relief, despite the existence of a 
privative clause in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).  The Court applied the 
principle of legality – a common law interpretive principle – in support to find that 
words should be read into the privative clause so that it did not apply to actions in tort 
against the Minister. 
 
 
∗ PhD Candidate, Monash University.  The author expresses his gratitude to Professor Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy, Associate Professor Julie Debeljak, Associate Professor Dan Meagher and Dr Susan 
Barkehall-Thomas for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.  The author also wishes 
to acknowledge the unimaginable and harrowing personal circumstances of the plaintiff, which must not 
be overlooked in discussions about the present case.  The views expressed in this article are the personal 
views of the author. 
1 [2016] FCA 483. 
2 See, for example, Elizabeth Byrne, ‘High Court Grants Injunction to Prevent Asylum Seeker Abortion’, 
ABC News (online), 7 April 2016 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-07/high-court-grants-
injunction-to-prevent-asylum-seeker-abortion/7308472>; Bianca Hall, ‘Refugee Battles for Abortion 
After Rape on Nauru’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 15 April 2016 < 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/refugee-battles-for-abortion-after-rape-on-
nauru-20160414-go67o6.html>; ‘Refugee Denied Abortion in Australia After Rape on Nauru: Report’, 
SBS News (online), 15 April 2016. 
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As Bromberg J’s judgment states, in this proceeding ‘[c]omplex issues are called up for 
determination’.3  However, this comment is focused on his Honour’s treatment of the 
principle of legality with respect to injunctions for tortious wrongs and certain maxims 
of equity.  It does not seek to address other aspects of the Court’s judgment on the 
broader law of negligence. 
BACKGROUND 
The facts  
The plaintiff is a young woman from an African country.4  She arrived at Christmas 
Island by boat in 2013 and was designated an ‘unlawful non-citizen’ under the Act.  
The plaintiff was detained by the Minister, taken from Australia and placed in the 
Republic of Nauru, being a ‘regional processing country’ under the Act.  The plaintiff 
was detained in a detention centre in Nauru from October 2013 to November 2014.  She 
was recognised as a refugee, released into the Nauruan community on a temporary 
settlement visa, and awaited resettlement.  As the Court described, the plaintiff ‘has no 
independent means.  She has been and remains dependent on the Minister for food, 
shelter, security and healthcare’.5 
 
On 31 January 2016, the plaintiff was raped whilst unconscious and suffering a seizure.  
At the time of the rape, she was living in accommodation in Nauru paid for by the 
Commonwealth government.  She became pregnant and required an abortion.6  Expert 
medical evidence indicated that there were significant risks associated with an abortion 
because of her neurological condition, poor mental health, and physical and 
psychological complications.7  An abortion was unsafe and illegal in Nauru.  The 
plaintiff sought an abortion in Australia.  The Minister, who had legal capacity to bring 
the plaintiff to Australia for this purpose, refused to do so on the basis that exceptional 
circumstances were not involved.8  The Minister made an abortion available for her in 
Papua New Guinea, and she was taken to Port Moresby.9  However, the plaintiff 
claimed that an abortion there was also unsafe and not legal – there was an absence of 
 
3 [2016] FCA 483, [13]. 
4 Ibid [2]. 
5 Ibid [3]; see also [76]-[80]. 
6 Ibid [5]; see also [82]-[85]. 
7 Ibid [5]-[6]; see also [306]. 
8 Ibid [7]. 
9 Ibid [8]. 
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medical resources in Papua New Guinea and an abortion would expose her to criminal 
liability.10   
 
Proceedings were brought by the plaintiff in the High Court, although the matter was 
ultimately referred to the Federal Court for determination.  The plaintiff sought, 
amongst other things, a quia timet injunction for apprehended breach of the Minister’s 
duty of care.11  The injunction proposed was for the Commonwealth to procure for her 
an abortion in Australia, or in the alternative, an abortion otherwise than in Nauru or 
Papua New Guinea.12  In response, the Minister relied upon (amongst other things) a 
privative clause in s 474 of the Act. 
 
The privative clause 
Section 474 of the Act is contained in Division 1 of Part 8 of the Act.  Section 474 
relevantly provides: 
474 Decisions under Act are final 
(1) A privative clause decision: 
           (a) is final and conclusive; and 
(b) must not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or 
called in question in any court; and 
(c) is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration 
or certiorari in any court on any account. 
 
The Minister submitted that an injunction could not be issued because it fell within the 
operation of s 474.  According to the Minister, his decision not to bring the plaintiff to 
Australia for an abortion, but to take her to Papua New Guinea instead was, pursuant to 
s 474(1)(c), not subject to injunction in any court on any account.13  The Minister did 
not contend that he was immune from liability under s 474 for any tortious wrong.  Said 
the Minister: ‘if there was a breach of a duty of care and the applicant suffered damage, 
 
10 Ibid [10]. 
11 Ibid [26], [467].  The Federal Court held that the Minister did owe a duty of care to the plaintiff, noting 
the plaintiff’s general dependence on the Commonwealth government, her reliance entirely on the 
Commonwealth government to procure a safe and lawful abortion, and the Minister having taking steps 
to assume responsibility for procuring an abortion: see [243]-[278].  
12 Ibid [21]. 
13 Ibid [410]-[411]. 
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“she gets damages”.’14  However, the Minister submitted, he could not be restrained 
from committing any tortious wrong due to the privative clause.  If the Minister 
‘engaged in tortious conduct, damages were available (having not been mentioned in 
s 474), but injunctive relief was not’.15 
 
Justice Bromberg rejected the Minister’s argument.  His Honour pointed to analogous 
case authorities on other provisions of the Act which placed time limitations on 
applications to the High Court, or limited the conferral of jurisdiction on the Federal 
Court, in relation to migration decisions.  In those cases, the courts read such provisions 
as applying only to judicial review applications, and not actions in tort.16  Justice 
Bromberg also gave significant weight to the Explanatory Memorandum and Second 
Reading Speech for the relevant Bill.17  Justice Bromberg considered it ‘evident’ that 
s 474 was similarly targeted at judicial review processes.18   
 
His Honour declined to follow a previous case authority to the contrary on s 474.19  
Justice Bromberg found that s 474(1), properly construed, involved ‘reading in’ of the 
following words (in bold): 
(1) A privative clause decision: 
           (a) is final and conclusive; and 
(b) must not, in an application for judicial review, be challenged, 
appealed against, reviewed, quashed or called in question in any 
court; and 
(c) is not, in an application for judicial review, subject to 
prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration or certiorari in any 
court on any account. 
 
 
14 Ibid [454]. 
15 Ibid [454]. 
16 Bodruddaza v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2007) 228 CLR 651; Fernando v 
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2007) 165 FCR 471; Tang v Minister for Immigration and 
Citizenship (2013) 217 FCR 55. 
17 Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Bill 1998 (Cth). 
18 [2016] FCA 483, [430]; see also [432]. 
19 Beyazkilinc v Manager, Baxter Immigration Reception and Processing Centre (2006) 155 FCR 465. 
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Justice Bromberg’s analysis on this issue could have ceased at this point.20  However, 
his Honour went further.  Justice Bromberg relied on two other grounds to find that the 
Minister’s construction was incorrect.  The first was the operation of the principle of 
legality.  The second ‘and related’21 reason was that the Minister’s interpretation would 
‘yield draconian and absurd results’.22 
   
The principle of legality 
It is necessary to set out some background to the principle of legality before proceeding 
further with Bromberg J’s judgment. 
 
The principle of legality is a common law interpretive principle.  It is a strangely 
named23 yet ‘unifying concept’24 in Australia, said to encompass a broad range of 
common law principles of statutory interpretation.  It has most commonly been 
associated with the presumption that Parliament does not intend to interfere with 
fundamental common law rights, freedoms and immunities except by clear and 
unambiguous language.25  However, it also extends to fundamental common law 
‘principles’ and departures from the ‘general system of law’.26   
 
In the seminal High Court case of Potter v Minahan27 in 1908, O’Connor J quoted 
approvingly from Maxwell on Statutes, which said: 
It is in the last degree improbable that the legislature would overthrow 
fundamental principles, infringe rights, or depart from the general system 
of law, without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness; and to 
give any such effect to general words, simply because they have that 
meaning in their widest, or usual, or natural sense, would be to give them a 
meaning in which they were not really used.28 
 
20 It should also be noted that s 474 falls within Part 8 of the Act, which is headed ‘Judicial Review’.  A 
heading to a Part forms part of an Act: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 13(2)(d).  This could have 
been another interpretive factor evidently in support of Bromberg J’s construction. 
21 [2016] FCA 483, [448]. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Philip Sales, ‘A Comparison of the Principle of Legality and Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998’ 
(2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 598, 600. 
24 Chief Justice J J Spigelman, ‘Principle of Legality and the Clear Statement Principle’ (2005) 
79 Australian Law Journal 769, 774. 
25 Bruce Chen, ‘The Principle of Legality: Issues of Rationale and Application (2015) 41(2) Monash 
University Law Review 329, 330 342, fn 91. 
26 Ibid 343-4. 
27 (1908) 7 CLR 277. 
28 Ibid 304, quoting J A Theobald (ed), Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (Sweet & Maxwell, 4th 
ed, 1905) (footnote omitted). 
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The principle of legality is directed at ascertaining Parliament’s actual legislative 
intention.29  In Coco v The Queen,30 the High Court said the principle of legality:  
must be understood as a requirement for some manifestation or indication 
that the legislature has not only directed its attention to the question of the 
abrogation or curtailment […] but has also determined upon abrogation or 
curtailment […].31 
The above passages in Potter and Coco continue to attract support of the High Court.  
Nevertheless, despite its long standing nature and appearance of orthodoxy, the 
principle of legality is not without controversy.  The principle’s rationale and operation 
is being increasingly scrutinised by commentators,32 and differences in approach to the 
principle are emerging amongst judges of the High Court.33  More relevantly though 
for present purposes, the scope of the principle of legality’s protection is unclear.  There 
can be no authoritative statement of what is protected by the principle, since such 
recognition is ‘ultimately a matter of judicial choice’.34    
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY APPLIED … AND EXPANDED 
Justice Bromberg began his analysis of the principle of legality by citing recent High 
Court authority which approved of the above passage from Potter and reaffirmed that 
departures from the general system of law are protected by the principle.35   
 
Justice Bromberg went on to consider the Minister’s submission.  His Honour was 
clearly perturbed by the notion that injunctive relief could not be granted for any 
 
29 Chen, above n 25, 334. 
30 (1994) 179 CLR 427. 
31 Ibid 437 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ) (citations omitted). 
32 Brendan Lim, ‘The Normativity of the Principle of Legality’ (2013) 37 Melbourne University Law 
Review 372; Dan Meagher, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights’ (2011) 35 
Melbourne University Law Review 449; Dan Meagher, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality’ (2013) 
38 Alternative Law Journal 209; Chen, above n 25; Louise Clegg, ‘ICAC v Cunneen and Legality’ 
(Speech delivered at the Gilbert & Tobin Centre for Public Law, 2016 Constitutional Law Conference, 
University of New South Wales, Sydney, 12 February 2016). 
33 See X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92, cf Lee v NSW Crime Commission (2013) 
251 CLR 196.  Independent Commission Against Corruption v Cunneen (2015) 318 ALR 391, [54] 
(French CJ, Hayne, Kiefel and Nettle JJ), cf [86]-[88] (Gageler J) (in dissent).  R v Independent Broad-
based Anti-corruption Commission (2016) 90 ALJR 433, [71]-[73], [76]-[77] (Gageler J).  North 
Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency Ltd v Northern Territory (2015) 326 ALR 16, [11], [23] (French 
CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ), cf [81] (Gageler J) (in dissent). 
34 Meagher, ‘The Common Law Principle of Legality’, above n 32, 211; Meagher, ‘The Common Law 
Principle of Legality in the Age of Rights’, above n 32, 459. 
35 [2016] FCA 483, [449]-[450], citing X7 v Australian Crime Commission (2013) 248 CLR 92, [86]-
[87] (Hayne and Bell JJ), [158] (Kiefel J); and R v Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption 
Commission (2016) 90 ALJR 433, [40] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 
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tortious conduct due to the operation of s 474.  This, his Honour said, was ‘a very large 
submission’ which went ‘well beyond the tort of negligence’.36  It would extend ‘to any 
tort committed or apprehended to be committed by the Minister, the Commonwealth, 
or an officer of the Commonwealth, using powers under the Act, but which is not, or is 
not yet, a jurisdictional error’.37  Justice Bromberg was also concerned about s 474’s 
operation across jurisdictions – the provision was not specific to the Federal Court; it 
would operate in this way across all courts in Australia.  The plaintiff would be 
completely shut out from seeking injunctive relief.38 
 
His Honour then asked a series of searching questions.  These were directed at 
ascertaining Parliament’s actual intention, consistently with the principle of legality’s 
rationale, particularly the likelihood of whether Parliament had intended for the 
outcome contended by the Minister: 
Suppose an applicant was being falsely imprisoned. Could it really be that 
the legislature intended that the falsely-imprisoned applicant could seek 
damages from the court from time to time during the course of his or her 
imprisonment, or after that imprisonment ended, but could never have the 
benefit of injunctive relief prohibiting his or her continued unlawful 
detention? Suppose it was clear that the Minister’s gross negligence would 
very shortly cause the death of hundreds of detainees. Could it really be that 
the legislature intended that no injunction could issue preventing the 
negligence and that the detainees’ descendants would have to wait for the 
detainees’ death and then seek damages?  
Suppose the Minister purported unlawfully to expropriate all detainees’ 
property. Would an injunction to restrain a conversion not issue? Suppose 
the Minister indicated he intended unlawfully to introduce corporal 
punishment in processing centres. Would an injunction restraining a 
common law battery not issue? Or, take the present case: suppose that the 
Minister’s duty to the applicant extends to procuring for her a safe and 
lawful abortion and suppose that the Minister told the applicant he had no 
intention of so procuring. Could it really be that the Parliament intended that 
the applicant’s choices were to take the risk of an unsafe or unlawful 
abortion, or to take the risk associated with having no abortion at all, and if 
she suffered damage in either case she would then have an entitlement to a 
remedy against the Minister?39 
 
 
36 Ibid [455]. 
37 Ibid.  His Honour gave the examples at [456]-[457]. 
38 Ibid [454]; cf SGS v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 34 NTLR 224.  See further 
[2016] FCA 483, [447]. 
39 [2016] FCA 483, [456]-[457]. 
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There are, of course, matters encompassed by the principle of legality which touch on 
the subject areas explored above.  At common law, there is a right to liberty of the 
individual.40  There is also a common law presumption that Parliament will not interfere 
with vested property rights41 or alienate property without compensation.42  Other 
common law presumptions include that Parliament does not intend to: ‘restrict access 
to the courts’,43 such that privative clauses purporting to oust judicial review should be 
interpreted restrictively;44 ‘authorize what would otherwise have been tortious 
conduct’;45 or ‘deprive a person of legal rights otherwise enjoyed against a statutory 
body’.46  There is general consensus that the above are protected by the principle of 
legality.47  
 
However, Plaintiff S99 breaks new ground.  Justice Bromberg found that the courts’ 
power to issue injunctive relief for a tortious wrong can be protected by the principle 
of legality.  His Honour considered that ‘[c]onsistently with the principle of legality, 
“irresistibly clear words” would be required before I would construe s 474 as precluding 
the issue of injunctive relief in the case of a tortious wrong.  I do not think the words 
are sufficiently clear.’48  This fortified his Honour’s conclusion that s 474 did not 
preclude injunctive relief except in judicial review proceedings. 
 
Justice Bromberg found that the potential outcomes of the Minister’s construction were 
‘irrational and draconian’ and ‘markedly depart[ed]’ from the general system of 
common law, ‘so far as it pertains to apprehended or continuing torts’.49  Moreover, his 
Honour categorised the following as ‘fundamental’ principles:50 ‘there is no wrong 
 
40 Re Bolton; Ex parte Beane (1987) 162 CLR 514, 520, 523, 532. 
41 Clissold v Perry (1904) 1 CLR 363, 373. 
42 Commonwealth v Haseldell Ltd (1918) 25 CLR 552, 563. 
43 Spigelman, above n 24, 775; Perry Herzfeld, Thomas Prince, and Stephen Tully, Interpretation and 
Use of Legal Sources: The Laws of Australia (Thomson Reuters, 2013) 226 [25.1.1950]. 
44 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476, which was also in respect of the operation 
of s 474, albeit in the judicial review context; Bare v IBAC (2015) 326 ALR 198, 226 [100]-[102] (Warren 
CJ) (in obiter, dissenting); 290-2 [330]-[336] (Tate JA), 362 [590] (Santamaria JA). 
45 Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, 436 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). 
46 Puntoriero v Water Corporation (2000) 199 CLR 575, 594 [59] (Kirby J) (dissenting); see also 588 
[34] (McHugh J), 613 [113] (Callinan J); and Board of Fire Commissioners (NSW) v Ardouin (1961) 109 
CLR 105, 116; Australian National Airlines Commission v Newman (1987) 162 CLR 466, 471. 
47 Herzfeld, Prince and Tully, above n 43, 226 [25.1.1950]; D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory 
Interpretation in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th ed, 2014) 255-9 [5.46].  
48 [2016] FCA 483, [459]. 
49 Ibid [458]. 
50 Ibid. 
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without a remedy’ (ubi jus ibi remedium);51 ‘equity suffers not a right without a 
remedy’;52 and ‘it is better to restrain in time than to seek a remedy after the injury has 
been inflicted’.53   
 
Significantly, Bromberg J’s decision on s 474 opens up the prospect of injunctive relief 
against the Minister for apprehended or continuing tortious wrongs in migration 
decisions.  However, the decision raises further questions.  Will this finding rear its 
head beyond s 474 and migration decisions?  The Court appeared to be spurred on by a 
number of case-specific factors in Plaintiff S99: a privative clause which referred to 
injunctions, but not damages; the Minister’s peculiar submission that remedy in the 
form of damages was available, but not injunctive relief; the unpalatable consequences 
of such a construction; and the all-encompassing operation of the privative clause 
across Australia’s courts.   
 
So does Plaintiff S99 stand for authority, more broadly, of a presumption that 
Parliament does not intend to preclude the issuing of injunctive relief for a tortious 
wrong, without clear and unambiguous language?  It may be that a statute makes 
changes to equitable remedies, by ‘modifying, expanding or narrowing (or even both at 
the same time), or (perhaps less usually) abolishing’ them.54  In light of Plaintiff S99, 
are such statutory provisions now to be read strictly so as not to preclude injunctive 
relief for a tortious wrong where it is otherwise available, except where there is clear 
and unambiguous language to the contrary?    In addition, the ‘fundamental’ principles 
recognised by Bromberg J (ie. there is no wrong without a remedy etc.) are maxims of 
equity.  Although the lines between common law and equity are blurred, it is fair to say 
that Plaintiff S99 takes the principle of legality further into the law of equity55 (see 
below).   
 
51 The Western Counties Manure Company v Lawes Chemical Manure Company (1873-74) LR 9 Ex 218, 
222 (Pollock B). 
52 Annuity and Rent Charge (1744) 1 Eq Ca Abr 31; 21 ER 851. 
53 Graigola Merthyr Company, Limited v Mayor, Aldermen and Burgesses of Swansea [1928] Ch 235, 
241-2. 
54 Joachim Dietrich and Thomas Middleton, ‘Statutory Remedies and Equitable Remedies’ (2006) 28 
Australian Bar Review 136, 138. 
55 Although ‘[s]ome lawyers would regard maintaining the continuing distinction between common law 
and equity […] as a sterile antiquated endeavour’, ‘it still makes sense to compare, contrast and analyse 
separate bodies of law called “common law” and “equity”’: Mark Leeming, ‘Common Law, Equity and 
Statute: Limitations and Analogies (Speech delivered at the Private Law Seminar, University of 
Technology, Sydney, 14 November 2014) 1, 2. 
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The principle of legality is not well known for its protection of maxims of equity.  
Surprisingly though, that proposition is not without support.  In Minister for Lands and 
Forests v McPherson,56 the New South Wales Court of Appeal (Kirby P, Meagher JA 
agreeing) considered whether the test for (what is nowadays known as) the principle of 
legality could be applied:  
in relation to basic principles of equity, where those principles have been 
developed over the centuries to safeguard the achievement of justice in 
particular cases where the assertion of legal rights, according to their letter, 
would be unconscionable?57 
The Court of Appeal was of the view that ‘[i]n principle, there would seem to be no 
reason why a similar approach should not be taken to basic rules of equity’.58  Extra 
curially, Leeming JA of the Court of Appeal and leading commentator on the law of 
equity has subsequently remarked that ‘[f]ew would quarrel with that reasoning’.59   
 
The Court of Appeal went on to say that the law of equity is ‘part of the legal order with 
which statute law must harmoniously operate’.60  It recognised that while equitable 
remedies are discretionary, that is a reason for ‘confining the operation of the equitable 
principle, not for denying its co-existence, so far as compatible, with the provisions of 
the statute’.61  In the context of the dispute in that proceeding, the Court of Appeal 
found that the power of the New South Wales Supreme Court to provide equitable relief 
against forfeiture had not been revoked by statute.62   
 
Although Bromberg J in Plaintiff S99 did not cite McPherson in support, his 
designation of specific maxims of equity as ‘fundamental’ is consistent with 
McPherson.  Alternatively, the law of equity arguably sits in the category of ‘the 
general system of law’ referred to in Maxwell on Statutes.  However, the proposition 
that the principle of legality covers maxims of equity is yet to find support in the High 
Court.  Moreover, some commentators have treated maxims of equity as not 
 
56 (1991) 22 NSWLR 687. 
57 Ibid 700. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Mark Leeming, ‘Equity: Ageless in the “Age of Statutes”’ (2015) 9(2) Journal of Equity 108, 125.  
However, see fn 66. 
60 (1991) 22 NSWLR 687, 700.   
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid 702 (Kirby P, Meagher JA agreeing), 715 (Mahoney JA). 
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encompassed by the principle of legality, but by a weaker principle of statutory 
interpretation – the presumption against altering common law doctrines.63  The 
distinction is between ordinary common law doctrines and those which are 
fundamental.64  So what are the implications of the maxims of equity drawing force 
from the principle of legality?  It should be noted that the law of equity has been the 
subject of extensive statutory incursions,65 and equity and statute share a complex 
interrelationship.66 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
As Gageler J has said about the principle of legality, ‘[o]utside its application to 
established categories of protected common law rights and immunities, that principle 
must be approached with caution’.67  In Plaintiff S99, the Federal Court applied the 
principle of legality to the equitable remedy of injunctive relief for tortious wrong, 
recognised particular maxims of equity as fundamental, and characterised apprehended 
or continuing torts as a general system of law.   
 
This expansion of the principle draws attention to how courts determine what the 
principle of legality should protect.  What is a ‘fundamental’ right, freedom, immunity 
or principle?  What is a departure from the ‘general system of law’?  The courts have 
not offered particularly insightful guidance in this respect.68  And if it extends further, 
where do the boundaries lie?   
 
63 Herzfeld, Prince and Tully, above n 43, 233 [25.1.1980]; but cf Pearce and Geddes, above n 47, 238-
9 [5.29]. 
64 Chen, above n 25, 358-9. 
65 For a summary of existing literature on this point, see Joachim Dietrich, ‘Teaching Torts in the Age of 
Statutes and Globalisation’ (2010) 18 Torts Law Journal 141, 141-3 and the references therein. 
66 See Leeming, above n 59, where his Honour was critical of the principle of legality for encouraging ‘a 
simplified legal analysis: that there is a homogenous class of statutes, which, when they are in conflict 
with “common law”, calls for a particular response’: 109.  According to his Honour, ‘almost inevitably 
statutes pick up the language of common law and equity, and in such cases it will be commonly be 
necessary to determine whether the language translates to the general law concept, or whether a new 
statutory creature with incidents resembling those at general law is denoted’.  If the latter, ‘the question 
is not merely the contestable issue whether an equitable doctrine is “basic” or “fundamental” so as to 
engage’ the principle of legality.  ‘Instead, the nature of equity is that much of its doctrines and remedies 
are susceptible to statute […] much of equity is supplemental to an existing body of law’: 125-6.  In 
respect of injunctions specifically, see I C F Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies (Lawbook Co, 
8th ed, 2010) 365-8.  See also J D Heydon, M J Leeming and P G Turner, Meagher, Gummow and 
Lehane’s Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (LexisNexis Butterworths, 5th ed, 2015) 132ff [4-215]ff; and 
Dietrich and Middleton, above n 54. 
67 Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd (2015) 317 ALR 279, 
296 [67] (Gageler J). 
68 Chen, above n 25, 345, 347-8. 
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Plaintiff S99 clearly illustrates that the principle of legality is not static or fixed in 
nature.  The principle is evolving.  Other areas of law in which the principle has been 
extended, or tentatively extended, include statutory rights, human rights and 
constitutional rights.69  Plaintiff S99 is but one recent example of the growing expansion 
of the scope of the principle.  What subject matter the principle of legality protects 
belies confident prediction. 
 
69 Ibid 331 and the references therein. 
